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The Constitutional Right of a Police
Officer to Make Political Contributions
Introduction
In Reeder v. Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners,1 and Pol-
lard v. Board of Police Commissioners,2 both the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a
Missouri statute that forbids officers or employees of the Kansas City
Police Department from making any political contribution3 against a first
amendment challenge.4 In reaching their decisions, these courts bal-
anced the first amendment right of police officers to make political con-
tributions5  against Missouri's interests in preventing ,municipal
corruption.6 Construing the United States Supreme Court's precedents
regarding governmental restrictions on the first amendment rights of
public employees, both courts held that the legitimate interests of the
state justified Missouri's ban on political contributions by Kansas City
Police Department employees.7 Both courts summarily dismissed the
possibility that Missouri's total prohibition on political contributions is
1. 733 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1984).
2. 665 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
3. Id. at 335 (citing Mo. RFv. STAT. § 84.830(1) (1978)). The statute provides:
No officer or employee in the service of said police department shall directly or indi-
rectly give, pay, lend, or contribute any part of his salary or compensation or any
money or other valuable thing to any person on account of, or to be applied to, the
promotion of any political party, political club, or any political purpose whatever.
In Pollard, the Missouri Supreme Court described this statute as designed to prevent municipal
political corruption in Kansas City. 665 S.W.2d at 336. See infra note 21 and accompanying
text.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech .... " As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out, the United States Supreme
Court has never spoken directly on the subject of whether public employers can prevent their
employees from making campaign contributions. Reeder 733 F.2d at 548.
5. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the United States Supreme Court made it clear
that political contributions are protected as a part of the first amendment rights of each citizen.
The Court characterized the campaign contribution as a form of political speech that "serves
as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views." Id. at 21. Political expres-
sion is a "most fundamental First Amendment activit[y]." Id. at 14. But see Wright, Politics
and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
6. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 545. The Eighth Circuit adopted the basic balancing test used in
Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 339, and mandated by Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968).
7. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 548; Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 342.
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overbroad.'
The United States Supreme Court decisions regarding restraints on
the first amendment rights of public employees require a balancing of the
individual's and the state's interests in order to determine the scope and
nature of permissible governmental restrictions.9 In the public employee
cases, the Court's balancing analysis in effect consisted of finding that
one interest was of serious import and that the other was not. 10 Either
the state or the individual interests prevailed, depending on which inter-
est was found to have substantial merit. Yet courts face situations in
which both the state's and the individual's interests are important, and
the Supreme Court's public employee cases do not address circumstances
in which the competing interests are of roughly equal importance.
In other cases involving first amendment rights of expression and
association and in cases stressing the legitimacy of restrictions aimed at
promoting an efficient and politically neutral civil service, the Court has
cautioned against overbroad restrictions on first amendment rights. 1 '
These cases require that given the importance of the first amendment
rights of political expression and association, even justifiable governmen-
tal restrictions be carefully and narrowly tailored.' 2 In other words, the
state must achieve its legitimate aims by methods which impose the least
restrictions on the first amendment rights in question.
The Reeder and Pollard courts nominally employed the balancing
approach required by the Supreme Court's public employee cases.' 3
However, the facts of Reeder and Pollard present a conflict of interests
that cannot be resolved as easily as the conflicts settled by the Supreme
Court in the public employee cases. In Reeder and Pollard, both the
state's interests in preventing municipal corruption and the first amend-
8. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 546-48; Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 340-41.
9. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. For an
analysis of the problems with the ad hoe balancing approach to the first amendment rights of
public employees, see Note, Politics And The Non-Civil Service Public Employee: A Categorical
Approach to First Amendment Protection, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 558 (1985). In general, this
Note divides the analysis of the first amendment rights of public employees into two categories:
first, the ad hoe balancing test required by Pickering; 391 U.S. at 568, and Connick, 461 U.S. at
141, which weighs the individual's right against the relevant government interests; and second,
the categorical approach of Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 372-73 (1976) in which the Supreme
Court has balanced the interests and prescribes a per se rule with more predictable results. See
generally Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983); Developments in
the Law-Public Employment: The Constitutional Rights of Public Employees, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1738 (1984).
10. For example, in Connick the Court found that a public employee's exercise of first
amendment expression did not significantly involve matters of public concern and thus could
not compare to the weighty state interests in promoting an efficient government agency. Con-
nick 461 U.S. at 146. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 97-126 and accompanying text.
12. Id.
13. See supra note 6.
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ment rights of police department employees to make political contribu-
tions are substantial. Unlike the Supreme Court's public employee cases,
neither interest in Reeder and Pollard could be dismissed as markedly
inferior to the other. Yet both courts, in effect, made just this error; they
dismissed the police officers' first amendment rights to make political
contributions as significantly less important than the state's interests in
preventing municipal corruption.14 On this basis, the courts justified
Missouri's total ban on the political contributions of police department
employees.
This Note contends that the Reeder and Pollard courts failed to bal-
ance the interests of the state and individual properly because they mis-
characterized these interests as being of unequal importance. This Note
suggests that when, as in Reeder and Pollard, a court faces competing
interests of approximately equal value, it should seek a compromise by
requiring that the state use the least restrictive method of serving its in-
terest. By insisting on the least restrictive method of achieving the state's
aim, a court protects, as far as possible, the important first amendment
rights of public employees to make political contributions and, simulta-
neously, promotes the legitimate interests of the state in preventing mu-
nicipal political corruption.
This Note analyzes the facts and reasoning of Reeder and Pollard in
detail. It then describes the development of judicial approaches to re-
strictions on the first amendment rights of public employees, which
culminates in the balancing approach. Next, the Note explores the basic
conflict of interests by examining both cases which stress the importance
of the first amendment rights of political expression and association as
well as cases which describe legitimate aims of government in restricting
certain political activities of public employees. Finally, the Note criti-
cally examines the balancing judgment employed in Reeder and Pollard,
concluding that they incorrectly balanced the interests at issue and up-
held an overbroad restriction on the first amendment right of Kansas
City police officers to make political contributions.
I. Pollard v. Board of Police Commissioners
Pollard, a Kansas City police officer, made a monetary contribution
to the campaign of John Carnes, a candidate for the Democratic nomina-
tion for the United States House of Representatives seat in Missouri's
Fifth Congressional District.15 The candidate reported the source of the
contribution to the Missouri Secretary of State as required by Missouri
law,1 6 and a newspaper reported the candidate's disclosure. 17 Because
14. See supra note 7.
15. Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 335.
16. Id. at 335 n.1 (citing Mo. RIv. STAT. § 130.086 (1978)).
17. Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 335.
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Pollard's contribution violated a Missouri law forbidding officers or em-
ployees of the Kansas City Police Department from making political
contributions,18 he was discharged from the department.1 9
In Pollard, the Missouri Supreme Court set forth the history and
purpose of the Missouri prohibition on political contributions by Kansas
City police employees. The court described the problem which prompted
passage of the statute:
Policemen who belonged to the party out of power were dis-
charged. Those who remained, and those newly hired, were obliged
to profess adherence to and to contribute a portion of their salaries
to the support of the dominant political party. There followed sub-
stantial discoveries of corruption touching not only the police de-
partment but the entire governmental structure of Kansas City.20
The aim of the statute was threefold: to protect police from political
pressure to contribute to the party in power, to protect the public from a
politicized police department, and to protect against a general growth of
municipal political corruption.21
The Missouri Supreme Court began its first amendment analysis by
distinguishing between the restrictions permissible with respect to a pri-
vate citizen and those permissible with respect to a public employee. It
asserted that a public employee's first amendment rights may be sub-
jected to greater restrictions than those of a private citizen.22 To support
this proposition, the Pollard court relied on McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford,23 quoting the famous language of Justice Holmes' opinion for
the Massachusetts Supreme Court:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few
employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to sus-
pend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness
by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain,
as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him.
On the same principle, the city may impose any reasonable condi-
tion upon holding offices within its control.24
The Pollard court acknowledged that political contributions involve sub-
stantial first amendment rights of free expression and association.2" But
it reasoned that these rights can be subject to governmental regulation
when, as in the case of public employees, the government's interest is
18. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 84.830(1) (1978)); see supra note 3.
19. Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 335.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 336.
22. Id. at 338-39.
23. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
24. Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 339 (quoting McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass.
216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892)).
25. Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 339 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
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sufficiently great.2 6 The court measured the constitutionality of restric-
tions on the political conduct of employees by balancing the validity and
importance of the state interests served against the first amendment inter-
ests of the public employee as citizen.27 In Pollard, the court concluded
that the governmental interests justified a total ban on political contribu-
tions by Kansas City Police Department employees.2"
The Pollard court conceded that the First Amendment requires the
state to show that the means chosen to achieve the state's interests are
the least restrictive and most appropriate to the task.2 9 However, the
Missouri Supreme Court concluded simply that a total ban on political
contributions by the Kansas City police was the only means by which the
state could achieve its significant ends.3" In reaching this determination,
the court responded to the argument that the statutory ban should be
limited to municipal or state campaigns by asserting that there is a close
connection among local, state and federal politics.31 If the proscription
were limited to local campaigns, the court feared that the state goals
would be thwarted because a contribution to a candidate for federal office
could benefit local politicians in the same party.32 Thus the Pollard court
held that all political contributions by Kansas City police officers have
potential for engendering corruption in Kansas City, regardless of
whether the campaign is local or national.
The Missouri court further reasoned that another less restrictive al-
terative, a monetary limit on contributions in lieu of a total ban, simi-
larly would frustrate the state's interests. It concluded that even a modest
contribution is a public demonstration of support, and "the legislature
could properly conclude that this is the very demonstration a police of-
ficer should not make." '33
Finally, the Pollard court asserted that similar restrictions on the
first amendment rights of police department employees have been upheld
in other instances. The court equated the Missouri statute's ban on polit-
ical contributions with statutes prohibiting police officers from serving on
political committees, working at polls, raising political funds, and run-
ning for office.34 By prohibiting political contributions, the Pollard court
26. Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 339.
27. Id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
28. Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 341.
29. Id. at 340 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) and NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964)).
30. Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 341.
31. Id. at 340.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 341.
34. Id. This analogy was to activities which may legitimately be limited in order to serve
significant state interests. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). See infra notes
112-126 and accompanying text.
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determined that Missouri simply placed an additional valid restriction on
the active political involvement of employees of the Kansas City Police
Department.
II. Reeder v. Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners
Sergeant Mark Reeder challenged the validity of the Missouri stat-
ute in an action in federal district court.35 The underlying facts were
identical to those in Pollard.36 The district court found the statute un-
constitutional on two grounds: (1) it was preempted by the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,17 and (2) it unconstitutionally
abridged Reeder's freedom of speech. The Eighth Circuit reversed both
of these rulings and remanded the case for consideration of Reeder's
equal protection claim.38
The Eighth Circuit panel in Reeder adopted the opinion in Pollard39
and responded to additional arguments raised by Reeder. First, Reeder
claimed that his contribution to the campaign of a candidate running for
a seat in the United States Congress representing Independence, Missouri
could not influence Kansas City politics or the Kansas City Police De-
partment.4° The court responded that a contribution by Reeder to the
federal congressional campaign might well benefit a Kansas City politi-
cian who has "'made common cause with [the federal] candidate.' ,41
The court acknowledged that the dangers of local corruption are more
obvious when a public employee contributes to a local campaign, but
concluded that the difference was not great enough to require that the
state forbid contributions only to local political campaigns.42
The Eighth Circuit panel asserted that public employees generally
are subject to more severe restrictions than the public at large.43 The
court described public employment as being conditioned on the surren-
der of certain rights, especially in the case of police officers.' To illus-
35. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 545.
36. Id.
37. The Eighth Circuit rejected the preemption argument in Reeder. 733 F.2d at 546.
The court quoted from the legislative history in order to show that state laws regulating polit-
ical activities of public employees were expressly excluded from the scope of 2 U.S.C. § 453
(1982). Id. at 545-46. This Note does not address the preemption issue because it has only
tangential relevance to the first amendment issue at hand.
38. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 548. The equal protection argument is based on the fact that the
Missouri law in question applies only to Kansas City and not to other cities in Missouri. Id.
This issue is beyond the scope of this work.
39. Id. at 545.
40. Id. at 546-47.
41. Id. (quoting Pollard v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 665 S.W.2d 333, 340 (Mo. 1984)).
42. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 546-47.
43. Id.
44. Id. The court said, "People who become public employees receive certain benefits and
undertake certain duties. One of those duties may require the surrender of rights that would
trate, the court pointed to an Eighth Circuit decision upholding a St.
Louis regulation forbidding any St. Louis police officer from running for
office in the Missouri Senate.a5 By contrast, the court asserted that the
state would never be allowed to enact a similar restriction in regard to
private citizens.46
As support for Missouri's right to forbid political contributions by
Kansas City police officers, the Reeder court cited Broadrick v.
Oklahoma47 and United States Civil Service Commission v. National Asso-
ciation of Letter Carriers.48 According to the court, these Supreme Court
decisions stand for the proposition that both state and federal legislatures
may substantially restrict the active political behavior of public employ-
ees: "The same power that may prevent a public employee from making
a political speech or conducting a political meeting (even on the em-
ployee's own time) may also forbid compaign contributions."'49
Officer Reeder claimed that Buckley v. Valeo,5° decided after
Broadrick and Letter Carriers, overruled those cases to the extent that
they permitted restrictions on political contributions by public employ-
ees."1 The court disagreed, reasoning that Buckley involved the first
amendment rights of the public at large rather than those of a special
class of public employees.52 In response to Reeder's contention that the
patronage dismissal case, Elrod v. Burns,53 also decided after Broadrick
and Letter Carriers, prohibited the discharge of public employees for
their political associations, the court reasoned that Elrod involved a bal-
ancing of different interests than those in Reeder.5" Whereas Reeder in-
volved legitimate interests of the state, Elrod considered only the
illegitimate interests of a newly elected government official in "purg[ing]
the ranks"55 of employees with differing political views.56 Finally, the
otherwise be beyond the reach of governmental power." Id. This language echoes the words
of Justice Holmes in McAuliffe, 155 Mass. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
45. Otten v. Schicker, 655 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1981).
46. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 547.
47. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
48. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
49. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 547.
50. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
51. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 547.
52. Id.
53. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
54. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 547.
55. Id. at 548.
56. Id. at 547-48. The Reeder court's analysis of Elrod is misleading. The court stated
that in Elrod there was no legitimate governmental interest at stake. That this mischaracter-
izes Elrod becomes clear when examining Elrod's progeny, Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518
(1980), where the Elrod test was restated: "[Tihe ultimate inquiry [in patronage dismissal
cases] is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate
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court referred to dicta in Kelley v. Johnson 57 stating that the campaign
contribution of a police officer is just one of many activities a state may
legitimately regulate in regard to its police force.58
III. The Development of Public Employees' First
Amendment Rights
A. Genesis of the Balancing Analysis
In McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, Justice Holmes expressed the
nineteenth century view that government or public employment is a priv-
ilege and not a right: "[a policeman] may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."59 The
government could insist on substantial restrictions of an employee's first
amendment rights as a condition of employment as long as the restric-
tions were "reasonable." 60 Thus the employee accepted restrictions on
his first amendment rights when he accepted public employment. This
reasoning discounted the public employee's interests in exercising his first
amendment rights as insubstantial.
The right-privilege distinction embodied in Justice Holmes' opinion
guided courts practically unchallenged until United Public Workers v.
Mitchell6 presented the United States Supreme Court with the first ma-
jor challenge to the power of the government to restrict the first amend-
ment rights of public employees. The Court responded by upholding the
constitutionality of the Hatch Act's broad restrictions on the political
activities of government employees.62 The Court's opinion reflected Jus-
tice Holmes' view in McAuliffe that as long as Congress' regulation of the
Elrod had a legitimate interest to be weighed: effective performance of public office. Elrod's
rule is that political affiliation does not have a significant impact on the job performance of
lower level and nonpolicy-maing employees. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 375. However, the Reeder
court was correct in noting that as a patronage dismissal case, Elrod is distinguishable from
Reeder.
57. 425 U.S. 238 (1976). Kelley held that the state as employer may regulate the hair
length of its policemen. In passing, Justice Rehnquist compared the legitimacy of a hair length
regulation with one forbidding a policeman to "take an active role in local political affairs...
or contributing." Id. at 246.
58. Reeder, 733 F.2d at 548. The Reeder court found in the Kelley dicta "an implication
that restraints on campaign contributions [sh]ould not be treated differently from other" per-
missible restrictions. Id. The court acknowledged that the Kelley reference is dicta but failed
to acknowledge the fact that the Kelley holding is based on the Fourteenth Amendment's
general guarantee of personal liberty, rather than the First Amendment. Kelley, 425 U.S. at
245. The Kelley decision is based on a rational basis test, id. at 247, not on the more demand-
ing scrutiny required in first amendment cases.
59. McAuliffe, 155 Mass. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
60. Id.
61. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
62. Id. at 78 n.2 (citing The Hatch Act § 9(a), 18 U.S.C. § 61h (1940), which prohibited
federal employees of the executive branch from "tak[ing] any active part in political manage-
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first amendment rights of public employees was within "reasonable lim-
its," the regulation is constitutional "even though [it] trenches to some
extent upon unfettered political action."63
In a 1952 decision, Adler v. Board of Education,' the Court reiter-
ated the traditional point of view taken by Justice Holmes in McAuliffe.
The Court upheld a provision of the Feinberg Law65 which disqualified
from public employment any person who joined a group advocating the
forceful overthrow of the government of the United States or of any
state.6 Justice Minton, writing for the Court, repeated Justice Holmes'
right-privilege distinction:
It is clear that [employees of the state] have the right under our law
to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will. It is equally
clear that they have no right to work for the State... on their own
terms. They may work for the [State] upon the reasonable terms
laid down by the proper authorities.... If they do not choose to
work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and
associations and go elsewhere.67
This reasoning was followed in a series of similar cases in the 1950's
dealing with anticommunist legislation. 8
However, the 1960's heralded a change in the viewpoint of the
Court. Rejecting the view that the state had virtually unlimited power to
place conditions upon the "privilege" of public employment,69 the Court
ment or in political campaigns"); id. at 79 n.3 (citing The Hatch Act § 15, 18 U.S.C. § 61e
(1940), which prohibited political activities by federal civil service employees).
63. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 102. In Mitchell, the Court acknowledged that other constitu-
tional provisions may also limit governmental restrictions on speech. For instance, "Congress
may not 'enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to
federal office, or that no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in mission-
ary work.'" Id. at 100.
64. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
65. Id. at 487 n.2 (citing the Feinberg Law, 1949 N.Y. Laws, ch. 361).
66. The Feinberg Law implemented section 12-a of the Civil Service Law, which permit-
ted the discharge of any employee who "becomes a member of any society or group of persons
which teaches or advocates that the government of the United States or of any state or of any
political subdivision thereof shall be overthrown by force or violence, or by any unlawful
means." Adler, 342 U.S. at 487 n.3.
67. Id. at 492.
68. See, eg., Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (discharge of a New York subway
conductor who refused to answer questions by his superiors pertaining to membership in the
Communist Party); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (a discharge similar to
that in Lerner involving a Pennsylvania school teacher); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341
U.S. 716 (1951) (dismissal for refusal to execute a "loyalty" oath).
69. The Court's change in position became clear in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). In Sherbert, the Court held unconstitutional the application of a South Carolina stat-
ute that denied unemployment compensation to those who were unemployed due to a refusal,
for religious reasons, to work at certain times. A Seventh Day Adventist who was unemployed
because she refused to work on Saturday, which was her Sabbath, was denied unemployment
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struck down a number of state loyalty oaths on vagueness and over-
breadth grounds.70
Ultimately, Holmes' fight-privilege distinction met its demise in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents.71 In Keyishian, the Court struck down
the Feinberg Law, which it had previously upheld in Adler.72 Justice
Brennan stated the Court's new point of view: "[C]onstitutional doctrine
which has emerged since [Adler] has rejected [Adler's] major premise.
That premise was that public employment... may be conditioned upon
the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by
direct governmental action."73 In Keyishian, the Court enunciated the
"doctrine of substantial interest, ' 74 which requires a court to balance the
interests of the employer against the constitutional rights of the em-
ployee.7" Even when the government has a legitimate aim, that end can-
not be achieved at the expense of the public employee's first amendment
rights if the government's objective can be accomplished by more narrow
means.
76
The Court's decision in Pickering v. Board of Education 77 expanded
this doctrine. In Pickering, a teacher was fired for publishing a letter in a
local newspaper that criticized the manner in which his employer, the
local school board, had handled bond issue proposals and had allocated
funds between the school's athletic and educational programs. 78 The
Court held that an employee's "right to speak on issues of public impor-
tance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public
employment.
79
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a
benefit or privilege." Id. at 404.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); cf Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967).
71. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See also Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinc-
tion in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-46 (1968), which elaborates the
"doctrine of unconstitutional conditions." This doctrine states that the government cannot do
indirectly, through manipulating public employment, for example, what it may not do directly.
Id.
72. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
73. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605.
74. See generally Rosenbloom & Gille, The Current Constitutional Approach to Public
Employment, 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 249, 259 (1975).
75. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06.
76. '-[Even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental [rights] when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.'" Id. at 602 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
77. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
78. Id. at 566.
79. Id. at 574.
In Pickering, the Court described the appropriate test as a balancing
of the employee's interest as a citizen to comment upon "matters of pub-
lic concern" against the state's interest as an employer in promoting and
providing efficient public services through its employees.8" The Court
viewed this balancing approach as the most comprehensive means for
courts to approach "the enormous variety of fact situations" which pres-
ent conflicts between public employees and employers.81 Because Picker-
ing's public criticisms of his employer were based upon issues of genuine
public concern and did not affect his performance at work or interfere
with the efficient operation of the school, the Court concluded that his
right to speak freely on issues of public concern outweighed the school
board's interest in limiting his contribution to public debate.82 Thus, the
Court's balancing resulted in a finding that the state had no interest at
stake as important as that of the public employee in exercising his first
amendment rights.8 3
The Court further refined its approach to the public employee's ex-
ercise of first amendment rights in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
School District,4 expanding the scope of first amendment protection to
include private expression on issues of public concern. In Givhan, a pub-
lic school teacher was discharged after criticizing school policies in a pri-
vate conversation with the school principal. The Court held that a public
employee does not forfeit her first amendment right of free speech by
communicating privately with her employer rather than disseminating
her views to the public.85 However, the Court speculated that on differ-
ent facts a confrontation between a public employee and her immediate
superior could implicate legitimate state interests; the efficient function of
the government workplace might be threatened "not only by the content
of the employee's message but also by the manner, time, and place in
which it is delivered."
86
Recently, in Connick v. Myers,87 the Court applied the Pickering
balancing test to the question of whether the First Amendment precludes
a public employer from discharging an employee who had circulated
within the office a questionnaire predominantly concerning internal office
80. Id. at 568.
81. Id. at 569.
82. Id. at 572-73.
83. The Court concluded that under the circumstances of the case "the interest of the
school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to public debate [was]
not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of
the general public." Id at 573.
84. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
85. Id. at 415-16. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist stated that "the rule to be
derived from [Pickering] is not dependent on that largely coincidental fact." Id.
86. Id. at 415 n.4.
87. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Winter 1986] POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
affairs.88 The Court first inquired as to whether the employee's speech
contained matters of public concern; if not, then the Pickering balancing
test would not apply and the First Amendment would not protect the
employee from discharge.89 The majority found only one question on
Myers' questionnaire that concerned matters of public interest suffi-
ciently substantial to trigger the Pickering balancing test.90
The Court then applied the balancing test to determine the constitu-
tionality of Myers' discharge. Balancing the government's interests as
an employer and the employee's first amendment rights required "full
consideration" of the government employer's interest in effective and effi-
cient operation.9" The Court ruled that the government's interest in pre-
serving close working relationships outweighed Myers' interest in
circulating a questionnaire which contained matter of only the most lim-
ited public concern. 92 The Court warned, however, that a stronger gov-
ernment interest might have been necessary if Myers' communication
had "more substantially involved matters of public concern." 93
The Court also acknowledged that the government had not shown
that Myers' questionnaire had caused any actual disruption in the office,
but reasoned that the government employer's reasonable belief that dis-
ruption would occur was sufficient to justify the restriction: "'[T]he
Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over
the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This includes the
prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient opera-
tion.' "I' The fact that Myers had communicated largely personal com-
plaints to co-workers lent additional support to the employer's
conclusion that efficient operation of the office was threatened.
95
In Connick, as in the other public employee cases, the scales of the
Court's balancing test tipped easily to one side. The government's inter-
est in Connick was great while the employee's exercise of first amend-
ment rights only insignificantly involved matters of public concern.96
88. Id. at 141.
89. Id. at 146.
90. The Court stated, "One question in Myers' questionnaire... touch[es] upon a matter
of public concern. Question 11 inquires if assistant district attorneys 'ever feel pressured to
work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates.'" Id. at 149. Clearly
political coercion within a government agency is a matter of public concern. Id. However the
Court thought that the question was not particularly significant when seen as part of what "is
most accurately characterized as an employee grievance" with limited first amendment value.
Id. at 154.
91. Id. at 150.
92. The Connick Court found that the question "touched upon matters of public concern
only in a most limited sense." Id. at 154.
93. Id. at 152.
94. Id. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974)).
95. Connick, 461 U.S. at 153.
96. See supra note 92.
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The Reeder and Pollard Courts had to look to Connick, Pickering and to
the history of the first amendment rights of public employees in order to
find the appropriate judicial test with which to judge Missouri's ban on
political contributions. Yet the Reeder and Pollard courts could not find
an exact factual analogy in these cases. In Connick, as in the other cases,
the Court was able to dismiss one of the competing interests without
much difficulty. In Reeder and Pollard this could not be done; the state
had a legitimate goal and the employee's political contribution clearly
involved a substantial matter of public concern.
IV. The Conflict in Principle: What is at Stake for the
Individual and the State
A. The First Amendment Interests: Least Restrictive Alternative
Freedom of political belief, association and expression are central to
our constitutional scheme: "The First Amendment protects political as-
sociation as well as political expression."97 Political association as a vehi-
cle for effecting political beliefs "is a form of 'orderly group activity'
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments .... The right to
associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this
basic constitutional freedom." 98
Political contributions are a part of an individual's right to associa-
tion and expression; accordingly, contributing to a political campaign is a
protected first amendment activity.99 Political contributions, like other
first amendment activities, are protected because as a democratic society
we have a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open." 1" This
commitment reflects our belief that open competition in ideas, policies
and philosophies of government constitutes the very essence of our dem-
ocratic process.1°'
Because first amendment rights have a preferred status in our consti-
tutional scheme, any significant impairment of these rights, such as the
right to make political contributions, must survive exacting scrutiny.
10 2
The state's abridgement of first amendment rights "cannot be justified
upon a mere showing of a legitimate state interest." °10 3 The state's inter-
est must be "paramount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on
the government to show the existence of such an interest."" ° In addi-
97. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
98. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973).
99. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
100. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
101. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976).
102. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64-65.
103. Kusper, 414 U.S. at 58.
104. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362.
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tion, the state's interests served by the abridgement of first amendment
rights must outweigh the resulting loss of those protected rights.
1°5
Moreover, the state must employ "means closely drawn to avoid unnec-
essary abridgment." 106 In Kusper v. Pontikes,107 the Court insisted that
the state use the least restrictive means appropriate to achieving its aim:
[A] State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict consti-
tutionally protected liberty. 'Precision must be the touchstone in
an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.' If the
State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate
interest, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles
the exercise of fundamental personal liberties.108
If conditioning the retention of public employment on the em-
ployee's obeying a total ban on political contributions is to survive consti-
tutional challenge, the condition must serve a vital governmental end by
a means that imposes the least restriction on the freedom of expression
and association represented in political contributions, and the benefit
gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected rights. 10 9
Unlike the questionnaire in Connick,110 Reeder's and Pollard's contribu-
tions to the campaign of an individual running for Congress are fully
protected by the First Amendment111 and clearly involved a matter of
public concern. The relative merit of Missouri's interests must be
weighed against the first amendment rights of these policemen. The gain
to Missouri must outweigh their right to contribute to the political candi-
dacy of their choice, and the state must show that it has chosen the least
restrictive means to accomplish its aim.
B. The State's Interests
The starting point, from the state's perspective, is the Supreme
Court's admonition that "[n]either the right to associate nor the right to
participate in political activities is absolute in any event." '112 In Letter
Carriers,113 the Court reaffirmed its holding in United Public Workers of
America v. MitchellI14 that Congress has the power to prohibit certain
classified federal employees from taking an active part in political party
management or political campaigns. In Letter Carriers, the Court rea-
soned that the government's interest in regulating the conduct and
105. Id.
106. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
107. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
108. Id. at 59 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)) (citations omitted).
109. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363.
110. See supra note 88.
111. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
112. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
567 (1973).
113. Id.
114. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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the speech of its employees... differ[s] significantly from [the in-
terests] it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of
the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the [employee] as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
[government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.115
Letter Carriers upheld section 9(a) of the Hatch Act, which prohib-
its federal employees from taking an "active part in political management
or in political campaigns." '116 The government interests in Letter Carri-
ers justified the interference with government employees' first amend-
ment rights: "Partisan political activities by federal employees must be
limited if the Government is to operate effectively and fairly, elections
are to play their proper part in representative government and employees
themselves are to be sufficiently free from improper influences."
'1 17
Other significant factors in the Court's decision were the federal
government's interests in (1) maintaining a civil service that is politically
neutral in fact and in appearance, (2) preventing "the rapidly expanding
Government work force [from being] employed to build a powerful, in-
vincible and perhaps corrupt political machine,"'118 and (3) assuring that
promotions are granted on the basis of merit rather than as a political
favor.119 The Court concluded that "neither the First Amendment nor
any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a law barring this
kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees."
120
In Letter Carriers, the Court applied the balancing test and found
the government's interests to be so important as to outweigh the loss of
first amendment rights suffered by the federal employees.121 In addition,
the Court found that the statutory means employed to achieve these im-
portant governmental objectives were sufficiently restricted in impact and
scope as to avoid being fatally overbroad.
1 22
In a companion case, Broadrick v. Oklahoma,123 the Court held that
a state can restrict the political activities of its civil servants in much the
same way that the Hatch Act proscribes partisan political activities of
federal employees. The state statute sustained in Broadrick prohibited
certain employees from becoming actively involved in political
115. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968)).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1982).
117. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564.
118. Id. at 565.
119. Id. at 555-58.
120. Id. at 556.
121. Id. at 564.
122. Id. at 581.
123. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
Winter 19861 POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
356 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 13:341
campaigning or management. 12 4 The Court reasoned:
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs
breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden
the exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn
and represent a considered legislative judgment that a particular
mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of
society. 125
In Broadrick, as in Letter Carriers, the governmental interests in
prohibiting state employees from becoming actively and publicly engaged
in campaigning, soliciting funds and running for office justified certain
restrictions on the employees' First Amendment rights. The Court, how-
ever, recognized that the restrictions must be narrowly drawn to achieve
the legitimate aims of the government.
126
V. Reanalyzing Reeder and Pollard
Reeder and Pollard present a direct clash between the state's power
to regulate the behavior of its public employees and the employees' inter-
ests as citizens in exercising their first amendment rights. In Reeder and
Pollard, both the interests of the individual and the state have substantial
merit. The state must justify its discharge of an employee for making a
political contribution by showing that termination is the least restrictive
means available to achieve paramount interests.
Applying the Pickering balancing test in Reeder and Pollard would
yield an obvious conclusion in favor of the state if Reeder and Pollard
had actively participated in a political campaign. Letter Carriers and
Broadrick clearly established the constitutionality of restrictions on ac-
tive campaigning.'27 However, Reeder and Pollard did not solicit funds,
votes or general political support for any political party or candidate;
Letter Carriers and Broadrick did not control the issue. Thus, the courts
in Reeder and Pollard were required to carefully ascertain and weigh for
themselves the relevant interests of individual and state. Both courts ac-
cepted the legitimacy of Missouri's three asserted interests: (1) protecting
police from political pressure to contribute to the party in power, (2)
protecting the public from a politicized police force, and (3) protecting
against a general growth of municipal political corruption.128 The courts
recognized that these interests must be weighed against the individual's
loss of a first amendment right, 29 and that the state must show that the
means it chose were the least restrictive ones necessary to achieving its
124. Id. at 606.
125. Id. at 611-12.
126. Id. at 612-13.
127. See supra notes 113 & 123.
128. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
aims." ° Both courts simply concluded that the state's aim of stymieing
local corruption was so important as to justify this restriction and that a
total ban was not broader than necessary.13 ' By so concluding, these
courts revealed that they viewed the state's interest as being of far greater
importance than the individual's first amendment interest.
However accurate the Reeder and Pollard courts' characterization
of the appropriate constitutional standard appeared initially, both courts
made several errors in concluding that the Missouri law, as it stood, was
constitutional. From the outset, both courts weakened the strength of
their analyses by relying on Justice Holmes' statement in McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford that a person "may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
13 2
This suggests that behind the weighing of the relevant interests, these
courts harbored the long discarded right-privilege distinction which
would condition public employment on the surrender of constitutional
rights. The United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected this
idea. 133
In addition, these courts are mistaken in characterizing a regulation
which completely bans political contributions as exactly analogous to the
restrictions on active campaign participation upheld in Letter Carriers
and Broadrick. 13 4 Making a campaign contribution to a political candi-
date is essentially a private act with no publicity or fanfare. Contribu-
tions such as Reeder's and Pollard's generally would go completely
unnoticed were it not for a Missouri law that requires the candidate to
report contributions to the Missouri Secretary of State. 135 In contrast to
the active solicitation of votes or funds forbidden by the laws upheld in
Letter Carriers and Broadrick,1 36 the private act of a police officer's writ-
ing and mailing a contribution check usually is unobserved by fellow em-
ployees. Thus Reeder's and Pollard's contributions could hardly be said
to have swayed or influenced employees of the Kansas City Police De-
partment. Nor could mailing a check be the dutiful signal of political
allegiance to the political party supported by the department. Thus the
state interest in preventing political corruption is not furthered by forbid-
ding private acts which bear no resemblence to public statements of sup-
port for a political party.
130. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 7.
132. 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). See supra notes 23-24 and accompany-
ing text. Although the Reeder court did not quote Justice Holmes' language, by expressly
adopting the Pollard opinion, which quoted Justice Holmes, the Reeder court indirectly en-
dorsed the right-privilege distinction. Reeder also includes language that echoes the right-
privilege distinction. See supra note 44.
133. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 48 & 127-128 and accompanying text.
135. Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 335 n.1 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.086 (1978)).
136. See supra notes 116 & 123 and accompanying text.
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In addition, both courts assert without evidence or analysis that a
contribution to a federal campaign can create the same problems that a
contribution to a local or state campaign may engender.137 A federal
campaign contribution supposedly can contribute to local political cor-
ruption in Kansas City because, as both courts assert, "local politicians
[may] have made common cause with [the federal] candidate."1 38 This
assertion seems to ignore the local nature of the problem of municipal
corruption that gave rise to Missouri's statute. As the Missouri Supreme
Court stated in Pollard, the ban on political contributions was in re-
sponse to extensive municipal, not national or statewide, political corrup-
tion.'39 The intent behind the ban was to stop the political corruption
which occurred when an officer's superiors could extort campaign contri-
butions from him in return for job security." Because the First Amend-
ment is concerned, these courts should have had persuasive evidence that
a contribution to a national political campaign contributes to local cor-
ruption before upholding the Missouri statute; the assumptions of an ap-
pellate court are not sufficient justification.
These errors in the Reeder and Pollard opinions, in part, arise from
the assumption that there is no better way to achieve the legitimate goals
of the state. Once the Reeder and Pollard courts found the state's inter-
ests to be worthwhile, the individual's first amendment interests received
no future consideration. Neither court diligently considered the issue of
whether there was a less restrictive means to achieve those goals.
4 1
Some alternative approaches are available. To prevent corruption in a
municipal police force, a state may simply forbid contributions to munic-
ipal elections, at least until there is some showing in fact that national or
state contributions foster corruption on the local level. An even more
accurate approach to this problem would forbid the solicitation of contri-
butions. This would prevent the extortion of political contributions in
the workplace but would allow the individual as a citizen to exercise his
first amendment right to contribute to the political cause of his choice.
As the law presently stands, a Kansas City police officer could not con-
tribute to a senatorial campaign in another state. Another possibility is
presented by the Hatch Act,142 which forbids certain federal employees
from becoming actively engaged in campaigning. This is a more direct
137. See supra notes 31 & 41-42 and accompanying text.
138. Pollard, 665 S.W.2d at 340; Reeder, 733 F.2d at 547 (quoting Pollard v. Board of
Police Comm'rs, 665 S.W.2d 333, 340 (Mo. 1984)).
139. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
141. Both courts acknowledged the "less drastic means" test but simply assumed that a
total ban was the only way to achieve the state's aims. See supra note 29 and accompanying
text.
142. See supra note 116.
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way of achieving the aim behind the Missouri law, and it does not ban
political campaign contributions.
Conclusion
The Reeder and Pollard courts used the appropriate constitutional
balancing test. Yet in balancing the relevant interests, they erred. The
error was twofold. First, they did not recognize that Reeder and Pollard
presented conflicts between competing interests of roughly equal impor-
tance. Second, because they had mischaracterized the relative impor-
tance of the interests at stake, they did not diligently seek a less
restrictive means of achieving the governmental aim.
In cases such as Reeder and Pollard, which present competing inter-
ests of the state as employer and public employee as citizen, courts must
candidly weigh these interests, acknowledging the possibility that both
may be worthwhile. If both interests are of relatively equal importance,
then a court should make every effort to find a compromise; by insisting
on the least restrictive means of securing the governmental interest, a
court will provide the fullest protection to both competing interests.
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